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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this action by virtue 
of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(j) (Supp. 1988). 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Third District 
Court awarding Plaintiff insurance benefits for the accidental 
death of her husband. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole issue presented for review is whether the 
death of Bryce Hardy from narcotic intoxication was a death by 
accident within the meaning of the Beneficial Life policy in 
question. Plaintiff acknowledges that in reviewing a 
determination made on the basis of stipulated facts this Court 
is not bound by the trial court's findings of fact nor 
conclusions of law. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is 
determinative of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a contract action wherein the Plaintiff 
claimed accidental death benefits arising from the death of her 
husband from narcotic intoxication. The matter was presented 
to the trial court on stipulated facts and the Court entered 
judgment for the Plaintiff on May 9, 1988. 
Bryce Hardy died on September 10, 1981 after taking an 
undetermined amount of narcotics. In the evening prior to his 
death, Mr. Hardy did not appear anxious or depressed and he 
made no statements reflecting any intention to take his own 
life. His activities were routine and included making 
preparations for the next day's work, reading to his children 
and watching television. 
Prior to his death, Mr. Hardy had been diagnosed as 
suffering from, and received treatment for, drug dependency. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah law recognizes that a death is accidental if, 
from the viewpoint of the insured, it is not the intended or 
expected result of the insured's own conduct at the time of his 
death. Our Supreme Court has expressly disavowed the notion 
that an insured's reckless conduct, which creates a foreseeable 
risk of serious harm or death, renders a death resulting from 
such conduct nonaccidental. In Utah, as in the majority of 
jurisdictions which have considered the question, death from an 
unintentional overdose of drugs is an accidental death. 
ARGUMENT 
BRYCE HARDY DIED AS THE RESULT OF AN 
ACCIDENTAL OVERDOSE OF NARCOTICS 
Bryce Hardy died on September 10, 1981 from the toxic 
effects of the ingestion of narcotics. There is no evidence 
that he knew, expected, or should have known that his actions 
on that date would cause his death. Beneficial Life is asking 
this Court to make a factual finding which is contrary to the 
evidence and is doing so on the basis of the unstated premise 
that anyone who engages in illegal drug usage has to be deemed 
to have intended to die by virtue of that conduct. 
The entire argument of the Defendant is predicated 
upon the false premise that Bryce Hardy somehow died as the 
result of a pattern of drug abuse. He did not. He died from 
the toxic effects of a single episode of narcotic ingestion. 
There is absolutely no evidence that his prior history of drug 
use played any part whatsoever in his death. His death was 
not, as implied by the Defendant, the culmination of years of 
addiction. It was the result of one overdose. Reference to ' 
the warnings Mr. Hardy had received that drug use could be 
expected to "shorten his life" in no way speaks to the issue of 
whether Mr. Hardy expected to die on September 10, 1981, which 
is the sole issue presented by this appeal. The Defendant's 
argument that Mr. Hardy's conduct, in continuing to use drugs 
despite warnings that he should not do so, was so reckless as 
to deprive his death of an accidental character has been 
expressly repudiated in Utah. 
In Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 669 P.2d 
410 (Utah, 1983), the Utah Supreme Court rejected the notion 
that reckless conduct which gives rise to a foreseeable risk of 
serious injury or death precludes a resulting death from being 
accidental. Noting that insurance contracts are construed from 
the point of view of the average man, the Court pointed out 
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that the "layman views an accident as any result which is not 
expected." 669 P.2d at 416. "Expected/' as the Court 
acknowledged, is a term that implies a "high degree of 
certainty." 
Thus, since the common meaning of the 
term [accident] is defined in terms of 
whether the event was naturally and probably 
expected or anticipated by the insured, it 
is that definition which must be applied, 
and not one founded on foreseeability. 
That construction is consistent with 
the rule that contract language should be 
"construed against the party who drew it and 
especially this is so in the case of 
contracts which are sold widely to the 
average man." 
The "unexpected event" standard laid 
down in Richards as to what constitutes an 
accident includes not only death resulting 
from conduct of the insured which is 
negligent, but also death resulting from an 
insured's conduct which is reckless. 
669 P.2d at 416-17 (citations omitted). 
The notion that Mr. Hardy must have intended his death 
because he had been warned of the dangers associated with 
taking drugs is directly rebutted by the Defendant's own 
recitation of Mr. Hardy's extensive experience with taking 
drugs without death following. This history, standing alone, 
raises the inference that Mr. Hardy would not believe, with a 
"high degree of certainty," that doing only what he had been 
doing for some years would cause his death on the date in 
question. While an individual could be warned repeatedly that 
drunk driving very well might cause a fatal accident, such 
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admonition in no way renders a death caused by drunk driving on 
a particular occasion a nonaccidental death. 
Moralizing about the lack of propriety involved in 
drug abuse does not alter the fact that if Mr. Hardy did not 
intend or expect his actions on the day in question to cause 
his death, then his death was accidental within the meaning of 
the contract. As noted by the Court in Miller v. Continental 
Ins. Co., 407 N.Y.2d 675, 358 N.E.2d 258 (1976): 
while it may be inferred that the decedent's 
introduction of heroin into his body was 
intentional, there is no proof whatsoever 
that he intended it to have fatal 
consequences or even that he was aware of 
the fact that the particular dose of heroin 
which he was taking at the time posed any 
threat of death at all. In today's society, 
the knowledge has been forced upon us that 
heroin and other drugs are most often taken 
to induce a temporary aura of relaxation and 
well-being completely incompatible with any 
desire on the part of their users to depart 
life. When we add to that the fact that the 
brotherly admonition that "it is bad for 
you" is likely to make as small an 
impression on drug users as do, for example, 
the regularly ignored official government 
warnings about the dire effect of cigarette 
smoking, can it be said that the trial court 
did not have the right to conclude that 
Douglas Miller, in injecting drugs into his 
bloodstream, did so without any thought of 
death in mind? We think not. 
358 N.E.2d at 259. 
Courts addressing the question of whether a drug 
overdose constitutes an accident within the meaning of a policy 
of insurance have repeatedly noted that insurance companies are 
free to incorporate policy exclusions for death from drug 
-5-
overdose and if they don't elect to do so, the courts should 
not write such an exclusion into the policy. For example, 
Beckham v. Travelers Ins. Co., 255 A.2d 532 (Pa. 1967), the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an insured's voluntary 
exposure to the risks associated with taking narcotics was not 
a defense to an accidental death claim. The Court held that 
death from an overdose of narcotics, absent evidence of 
suicidal intent, was accidental. 
While we see nothing improper in a 
contractual limitation which would disclaim 
coverage in cases such as the instant one, 
we are unwilling to recognize such a 
restriction on the basis of the ambiguous 
language contained in this policy which the 
company knew was susceptible of different 
interpretations. Andrew Beckham's policy 
provided for double indemnity in the event 
of an accidental death. "When a man has 
died in such a way that his death is spoken 
of as an accident, he has died because of an 
accident. . ." 
225 A.2d at 537 (citations omitted). In a concurring opinion, 
Justice Musmanno described eloquently the reasons why deaths 
from dangerous conduct are nonetheless deaths by accident. 
The person who drives his automobile at 
100 miles per hour on a congested highway 
is, in metamorphical language, "committing 
suicide," but if he is killed it does not 
legally or logically follow that he actually 
intended to take his life. Many if not 
perhaps most, fatalities of a violent 
character, (where crime is not involved) are 
due to poor reasoning, neglectful conduct, 
or a reckless attitude on the part of the 
deceased. An insomniac takes too many 
sleeping pills because he yearns to erase 
with a weary arm the slate of exhaustion, 
pain or sorrow; the swimmer dives into a 
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shallow pool, seeking the exhilaration of 
cooling waters to drown the fatigue of a 
tired and weary body; a pedestrian runs 
across the street in front of a speeding 
street car because he sees on the other side 
of the thoroughfare a dear friend whose 
companionship will be medicine to his 
loneliness and despair. Where death results 
in such cases the result is accidental even 
though the deceased voluntarily rode the 
thunderbolt which killed him. 
Andrew Beckham took an overdose of 
narcotics. Anyone who has read the classic 
Confessions of an English Opium Eater by 
Thomas DeQuincy will understand the 
beguiling heaven toward which Beckham was 
directing his steps as he followed the 
inviting primrose path into the soothing 
dreams of nepenthe. 
Andrew Beckham wanted to live, if only 
to dive again into the shallow pool of 
artificial exhilaration, if only to cross 
the street to embrace the morphine 
sweetheart of heart's ease. He used bad 
judgment, he was reckless, he did not want 
to bring bereavement and sadness to his 
mother, and it is comforting to know that 
she will not be denied the money he provided 
to help her along the remainder of her 
lonely journey when he, even through his own 
negligence, involuntarily left her. 
225 A.2d at 537-38 (Musmanno, J., concurring). 
There is virtual unanimity in jurisdictions, like 
Utah, which have abandoned distinctions between "accidental 
means" and "accidental results" and tests predicated on 
foreseeability of result, that drug overdoses resulting in 
death are accidents. For example, in O'Toole v. New York Life 
Ins. Co., 671 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1982), the Court noted that it 
was within the insurance company's power to exclude coverage 
for death from overdose and if it did not do so then neither 
should the courts. 
In the instant case, the policy 
excluded death by suicide, but an exclusion 
for death resulting from the self-
administration of drugs was not stated. In 
addition, the insurance contract did not 
deny benefits if the insured died during the 
commission of an unlawful act. Under these 
circumstances, the question whether the 
policy extended coverage in this type of 
case is, at best, unclear. Consequently, 
the trial court was correct in awarding the 
accidental death sum to the plaintiffs, for 
it is "hornbook law that whenever ambiguity 
is found in the provisions of an insurance 
contract, such ambiguity will be resolved in 
favor of the insured so as to provide him 
with the broadest coverage consistent with a 
reasonable interpretation of the contract." 
671 F.2d at 915 (citations omitted). 
In Marsh v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Inc., 70 
Ill.App.3d 790, 388 N.E.2d 1121 (1979), an Illinois Court of 
Appeals held that, as a matter of law, death from an unintended 
overdose of heroin was a death by accident. The Court 
specifically rejected the insurer's contention that the death 
was not accidental because it was not "unexpected, unusual or 
unforeseen." The Court held that use of a foreseeability test 
like that employed in tort or criminal law was simply 
inappropriate in a case construing an insurance policy. Noting 
that the insured's conduct was undoubtedly reckless and his 
death foreseeable, the Court nonetheless held it to be 
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expr^'-'y and unequivocally rejected the I oreseeabili ty test 
for interpreting accident policies in Hoffman, supra. The 
test, as set forth above, is whether the result was actually 
expected by the insured at the time of the conduct in 
question. If there is no direct evidence of the insured's 
intent, then the common law presumption against suicide 
precludes a finding of actions on the part of the insured by 
which he "expected" he was going to cause his own death. See, 
e.g., Carter v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 65 Utah 465, 238 P. 259 
(1925). 
The Defendant wants this Court to create a policy 
exclusion it chose to omit and to do so by finding that 
Mr. Hardy's failure to heed the warnings of others that he 
should avoid taking narcotics is the equivalent of intending to 
die on each occasion when he took drugs, including the last. 
The irony of this argument is that Mr. Hardy had learned from 
his own addiction that he could take drugs repeatedly without 
death ensuing as an immediate consequence. Given his own 
history of drug use, it cannot be logically inferred that 
Mr. Hardy "expected" death to follow any episode of drug 
"misuse" because there had been many (as the Defendant itself 
points out) when it had not. It is this experience which would 
define Mr. Hardy's expectation, not the "foreseeability" of his 
life being shortened by an unexpected overdose. 
Although the law frequently employs the 
proposition that one intends the natural and 
probable results of his conduct in tort and 
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CONCLUSION 
Beneficial Life urges this Court to find that Bryce 
Hardy must have intended to die on September 10, 1981 because 
he had been previously warned that taking drugs could shorten 
his life. Therefore, it argues, Mr. Hardy's death was the 
natural product of his own conduct which he must be presumed to 
have intended and not an accident. This logic has been 
rejected in Utah, and virtually every other jurisdiction, 
because it substitutes an after the fact evaluation of events 
for that which the insured actually made. In his famous 
dissent in Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491 
(1934) (Cardozo, J., dissenting), which has now been uniformly 
accepted as a correct statement of the law, Justice Cardozo 
noted that every result in life follows as a "natural and 
probable" consequence of some intentional act but "accidents" 
occur nonetheless. 
"Probably it is true to say that in the 
strictest sense and dealing with the region 
of physical nature there is no such thing as 
an accident." . . . On the other hand, the 
average man is convinced that there is, and 
so certainly is the man who takes out a 
policy of accident insurance. It is his 
reading of the policy that is to be accepted 
as our guide, with the help of the 
established rule that ambiguities and 
uncertainties are to be resolved against the 
company. 
291 U.S. at 499 (citations omitted). 
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